First, the current international order appears to be quite unstable. The international community is confronting at least four major crises: the humanitarian crisis following the pandemic, the international security crisis resulting from the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the conflicts in the Middle East, the global economic crisis brought about by protectionism, and the global order crisis stemming from U.S.-China competition. These crises fundamentally affect globalization, and while they may not represent outright anti-globalization, they at least signal a retreat from it. Additionally, beyond traditional geopolitical issues, there has been a rise in technology-related politics. The current assessments of the international order vary widely, and it remains to be seen whether the ongoing chaos is merely a temporary disturbance or the onset of deeper turmoil.

Second, U.S. leadership is becoming increasingly unstable. The Trump administration highlighted that U.S. leadership is not always rational or consistent. While the Biden administration’s declaration of “America is back” provided some reassurance, it has not fully convinced the international community. The intense competition between Trump and Harris in the 2024 presidential election indicates that the U.S. is facing internal turmoil. The Republican Convention showed the divisions and conflicts within the country, and its foreign policy approach leaned toward isolationism. In contrast, the Democratic Convention expressed a willingness to address internal issues but lacked specific solutions for foreign policy. Regardless of who wins the presidential election, it appears that the U.S. may continue to prioritize domestic challenges, with a declining interest and limited capacity for international responsibilities and leadership.

Third, China is transitioning its power from hard to soft. Although it has not yet developed global values and models like the U.S., China is showing a willingness to propose and implement visions and contributions that other major powers lack. Offering these visions and methods to the international community is meaningful. It is certainly more valuable than mere criticism or inaction. China continues to shape its global influence through initiatives such as the community of shared future for mankind, the Belt and Road Initiative, three major global initiatives, and Chinese modernization.

Fourth, the characteristics of the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period are emerging in the international order. Signs of multi-polarity are becoming evident. The U.S. focus on its own interests is creating new competitors. As the U.S. overall power declines—be it in economic, military, territorial, or demographic terms—countries and regions like China, Russia, the European Union (EU), India, and Brazil are rising, each with at least one competitive advantage.

Fifth, there is a rise of multiple powers. Following the rise of China and the assertive rise of the U.S., we are now seeing the emergence of countries that don’t align with any specific nation or coalition and prefer to occupy a third space. In his book The Rise of the Nones, Pastor James White from the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) uses the term “nones” to refer to people who do not belong to any particular religion. This term can also describe the current state of international relations. People are increasingly dissatisfied with the existing order and the U.S. leadership, a trend that is also reflected in the Global South.

Sixth, U.S. impatience toward its relationship with China is growing. It is accurate to refer to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry as a Cold War. However, there is still debate over whether it is appropriate to label the U.S.-China relationship as a “new cold war”. That said, since Trump’s administration, there has been an increasing consensus that U.S.-China relations have entered this new phase.

The key to at least five of these trends lies in the U.S.-China relationship. The state of U.S.-China relations can accelerate, delay, or alleviate the other four trends. Depending on how U.S.-China relations develop, a new cold war may or may not emerge. Personally, as a year is divided into 24 solar terms, I compare the U.S.-Soviet Cold War to the periods of Minor Cold or Major Cold. Although a cold front is forming between the U.S. and China and “Cold Dew” has arrived, it is not yet the “Winter Solstice” or the “Beginning of Winter”. It is still too early for a cold war, but we have reached a point where we need to consider how to prevent the international landscape from worsening further. That concludes my presentation. Thank you.

Hwang Jaeho, Dean of the Korea Institute of Global Strategic Cooperation and Professor of Korea University of Foreign Studies